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
WAR TERMINATION: THE QUEST FOR THE DESIRED END STATE

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.



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## Abstract of

### WAR TERMINATION: THE QUEST FOR THE DESIRED END STATE

The subject of war termination has steadily gained more attention. Before the end of the Cold War, conflict termination was less complex. It was usually a result of the annihilation of your enemy or occupation of your adversary's country. Since the end of the Cold War, US objectives for committing forces to resolve a conflict have become more limited and are often centered on US values such as human rights and the promotion of democracy. Therefore, it has become more difficult for the commander to identify or achieve the desired end state that may provide for an enduring peace. What is often the case is the commander will achieve the military objective that will provide the requisite leverage to cease hostilities but the conflict will continue. Desert Storm is an example of this and a possible explanation to why we are still engaged in Iraq is offered.

This paper identifies three areas that are difficult either for identifying or achieving the desired end state. The three areas are; the adversary's background, proper planning, and clear political objectives. The areas were identified by examining three conflicts; JUST CAUSE, DESERT STORM, and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. Each area if not properly addressed may result in the commander not achieving either operational or strategic objectives. To assist the commander in planning it is recommended to incorporate campaign planning direction given in Joint Publication 3-0 with the commonly recognized phases of a dispute; dispute, pre-hostility, hostilities, post-conflict, dispute and settlement. By combining the two, the commander can better apply operational art such as branches and sequels to arrive at strategic aims.

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*No one starts a war---or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so---without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it. The former is its political purpose; the latter is its operational objective.<sup>1</sup>*

(Clausewitz, On War)

*If the conditions have been properly set and met for ending the conflict, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the enemy from renewing hostilities. Moreover, the strategic aims for which the United States fought should be secured by the leverage that US and multinational forces gained and can maintain. Wars are fought for political aims. Wars are only successful when political aims are achieved and these aims endure.<sup>2</sup>*

(Joint Publication 3-0)

*It was the my first mission into the Provide Comfort II area of operations. Turning my F-15 to to enter northeastern Iraq, I checked in with the Airborne Command Element and performed the last checklist items to setup my cockpit for combat. It was January of 1996. Just five years prior the United States and its coalition partners had decisively beaten Saddam Hussein. Why were we still flying combat missions over Iraq?<sup>3</sup>*

(Lt Col Bob Leeker)

### Introduction

War Termination.....Joint Publication 3-0 directs Joint Force Commanders to plan for it; the classical theorists Clausewitz and Sun Tzu certainly support Joint Publication 3-0's direction. Yet, commanders still grapple with how to terminate conflicts to achieve strategic aims.\* Moreover, the how and when to terminate a conflict is a historical problem. The most notable dilemmas in modern times are World War I, Korea and Vietnam. Planning for war termination is as equally important and difficult as planning for the conduct of war. The consequence of not properly planning for war termination is, at best, you return in an attempt to resolve the conflict and at worse, your strategic aims are never realized.

There are many facets to war termination. Also, much has been written about the subject. This paper will address just one facet of war termination, the *desired end state*. Moreover, it will identify for an operational-level planner three areas that are difficult either for identifying or achieving the desired end state. The first is the importance of knowing the military, economic, political and social history of the adversary. This allows the commander to assess the adequacy of

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\* There are numerous examples such as Just Cause, Desert Storm, UNITAF and UNOSOM II, and Uphold Democracy that provide support for this statement.

his strategy for achieving the desired end state. The second is the importance for proper planning to achieve the desired end state. Through proper planning, resources can be properly allocated and the feasibility of the strategy can be assessed. Finally, the most important, is understanding the need for clearly stated political objectives. An understanding not only provides the commander the ability to identify the end state but also to anticipate issues that may alter the desired end state. These three areas were arrived at by examining three conflicts; JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989), DESERT STORM (Iraq, 1991), and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti, 1994).

Additionally, DESERT STORM will be examined regarding the desired end state to provide a plausible answer to why we are still flying combat missions both in northern and southern Iraq. However, this paper is not written to provide a judgment of how well DESERT STORM or any of the operations was accomplished. That judgment is for historians. It is written to emphasize the importance of the desired end state and to place war termination at the same level as campaign planning in the combatant commander's theater strategy. Before we examine the three areas it is best to discuss terminology and provide some definitions.

### **Definitions and Explanation of Terms**

Various writers use different definitions when addressing the subject of war termination. This lends to the confusion of the subject and provides evidence to how difficult the subject can be. Moreover, the Joint Publication series adds to the dilemma by not providing definitions for the operational planner. The following definitions are extracted from multiple sources and provide an avenue to assist in understanding the subject of war termination.

**Conflict** is a clash of political, ideological, or economic interests between two or more groups.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, conflict is that realm of conditions in which adversaries employ the threat or application of military force to achieve a political objective or outcome.<sup>5</sup>

**Conflict termination** occurs when a belligerent achieves intended political aims and has the requisite leverage to impose his will--through the threat or application of coercion--on his adversary.<sup>6</sup> Conflict termination signals the end of hostilities and is often referred to as war termination. Joint Publication 3-0 refers to it as "termination."<sup>7</sup>

**Conflict Resolution** is an extensive discipline encompassing the sociological aspects of interpersonal, community, domestic, organizational and international disputes. In this regard, it is an analytical and problem-solving process involving long-term transformation of political, social and economical systems.<sup>8</sup>

The **end state** is defined as a clear and concise description of required conditions that when achieved, will accomplish the national strategic objectives.<sup>9</sup> Joint Publication 3-0 states that the **desired end state** should be clearly described by the National Command Authority (NCA) before Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action. An **end state** is the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives.<sup>10</sup>

### **Adversary Background**

Joint Publication 3-0 recognizes the underlying causes of a particular war--such as cultural, religious, territorial, or hegemonic--must influence the understanding of conditions necessary for termination of hostilities and resolution of conflict.<sup>11</sup> However, as the military plans to intervene in a conflict, many resources are expended to understand the enemy's capabilities to wage war. To a lesser extent military planners focus on the economic, political and social aspects of the adversary. However, it is precisely these aspects of the adversary's history (the adversary's culture) that the cause of conflict festers and may ultimately give way to hostilities. If one assumes that the ultimate strategic aim is to have an enduring resolution of the conflict, then the desired end state must account for the underlying cause of the conflict. If there is a lesser

objective, it is still imperative to understand the adversary's background to assess the adequacy of the commander's strategy to accomplish the articulated desired end state.

More than ever the post-Cold War era requires the military planner to understand the causes of conflict. Before this era, more specifically before World War II, conflict termination was achieved through either the annihilation of your enemy or occupation of his country. The period from the end of World War II to the collapse of the Soviet Union provided a period when aims were more limited.\* The post-Cold War era has brought even more limited and less precise aims that are focused on US national interests and values such as human rights, regional stability, and the advancement of democracy. Evidence to this is contained in the US National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. It states that we will send American troops abroad when our interests and our *values* are sufficiently at stake.<sup>12</sup>

Operation JUST CAUSE provides one example of not understanding an adversary's background. President Bush set four strategic objectives for Operation JUST CAUSE-protect American lives, ensure the implementation of the Panama Canal Treaties, restore Panamanian democracy, and bring Manuel Noriega to justice.<sup>13</sup> Restoring Panamanian democracy would prove the most difficult because Panama was not a democratic state. Since the early 1900's the country had been ruled by the National Police Force. Although civilians were designated as governmental officials, including the President, the political process was manipulated and ultimately controlled by the National Police Force. Richard H. Shultz's book, *In the Aftermath of War*, uses the terminology of "praetorian rule" to describe this condition of a civilian government dominated by a military organization.<sup>14</sup> As a result of not understanding this societal issue, the defeat of the Panamanian Defense Force\*\* resulted in massive looting, a US installed civilian

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\* Limited in the sense that they do not seek unconditional surrender through the total defeat of the enemy.

\*\* Noriega's National Police Force.



government that was corrupt and dysfunctional, and a decaying societal infrastructure that had suffered from years of neglect.<sup>15</sup> The objective of restoring democracy was not immediately attainable. What was necessary was a plan that would provide basic security for Panama upon achievement of military objectives while establishing a temporary government that could provide the basic necessities for Panamanians. It would have been more appropriate to establish follow-on objectives and a desired end state for conflict resolution that would promote the development of a government with democratic values.

### **Planning for the Desired End State**

The military, as in many large organizations, has traditionally devoted much attention to planning and training for war. However, much of the planning is just that, for war, for the execution of major operations and campaigns that will secure a military objective to provide the requisite leverage for the accomplishment of a national political objective. Jane E. Holl, executive director of Carnegie's Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, argues the commander should focus on winning the conflict; figuratively speaking he is planning to "take the hill" and as such, any planning for conflict termination or exit strategy\* diverts his attention and his resources to activities that are not associated with his primary military objective.<sup>16</sup> This argument has merit. However, there has been an ever increasing responsibility placed on the military commander to provide the requisite leverage to secure national objectives and to make the transition from conflict termination to post hostilities with the intent to achieve a desired end state resulting in conflict resolution. An early example of this increased responsibility was MacArthur during the Occupation of Japan following World War II. Subsequent to MacArthur the post-Cold War era has provided numerous examples of the military commander accomplishing more than the conflict

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\* Exit strategy is the removal of US military combat forces when an intermediate end state has been achieved.

termination phase. When viewing current National Security Strategy and the US movement towards more limited objectives, the importance of planning for conflict termination and subsequent phases will continue to increase. How then do we plan for post-hostilities and the desired end state?

A phased approach appears to be the answer. How then, do we define the phases and what pitfalls may be associated with the phases? Joint Publication 3-0 discusses the merits of phasing for campaigns. Primarily, phasing is a tool to assist commanders to think about the entire operation and to define requirements. The primary benefit is the assistance it provides commanders in achieving major objectives.<sup>17</sup> Joint Publication 3-0 also defines the phases that should be considered. They are pre-hostility, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and the post-hostilities and redeployment phase.<sup>18</sup> Notice that each of these phases primarily addresses force issues and *not* the desired end state.\* Bruce Clark, in *Conflict Termination: A Rational Model* defines six phases of a conflict. The first phase is the dispute phase, then pre-hostility, hostilities, post-hostilities, dispute and settlement.<sup>19</sup> Bruce Clark's definitions, or permutations thereof, are widely recognized when addressing the subject matter of war termination. Each set of phases has similarities, however, Joint Publication 3-0 campaign phasing is designed more for the operational level. Bruce Clark's phases, because he recognizes both the origins of conflict and conflict resolution, are at the strategic level.

The solution for better guidance to the geographic combatant commander is found by combining the two approaches of phasing. By using Joint Publication 3-0's acknowledgment of the desirability of phasing, its' direction on the importance of termination and desired end state, and then combining it with the strategic level phases of conflict, the combatant commander can

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\* Throughout Joint Publication 3-0 the concepts of desired end state and others that we have and will address are brought out. The point here is that the campaign phases and planning do not appear to tie in with the "bigger picture" of what is necessary to conduct successful war termination planning.

focus on planning the campaign as well as developing a plan for each phase of the strategic level conflict. Moreover, by considering each of the newly defined phases, conflict, pre-hostility, hostilities, conflict termination, post-hostilities and conflict resolution, it provides the means for the commander to focus on the underlying causes to the situation and plan for end states to each of the phases. Finally, the strategic end state remains a political decision and can occur at the end of any phase dependent upon the guidance given by the NCA.

This approach also allows application of operational art at the strategic level. If each phase has been delineated and planned based on known objectives, then the planner can develop branches based on US National Security Strategy and the CINC's theater strategy.

An additional benefit is the ability to concurrently plan the phases, plan for transitions between the phases, and define requirements for forces, resources and time.<sup>20</sup> Through concurrent planning force requirements can be anticipated from the first to the last phase. This will supply the required lead time for activation of Reserve Component (RC) forces. This then leads to a more efficient use of RC forces and identification of Civil Affair (CA) units that are essential in developing plans for post conflict termination. Concurrent planning also provides for the better integration of government agencies by allowing them to make inputs early in the planning process. Additionally, the commander can anticipate the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGO's) and private volunteer organizations (PVO's) throughout each of the phases. Each of these issues, as well as the importance of planning, presented problems or was noteworthy during JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

JUST CAUSE was the first post-Cold War intervention for the US and provides valuable insight towards modern war termination efforts. It was earlier addressed how a lack of

background information on Panama's government and society led to chaos once the Panamanian Defense Force was eliminated. This chaos also points to the necessity for having effective concurrent planning of phases that will provide for national strategic objectives. This is best captured with the following passage from Richard Shultz's *In the Aftermath of War, Just Cause*: The crisis in Panama continued to escalate, and Thurman focused his attention on Blue Spoon-- not on Blind Logic.\* He notes that "I did not even spend five minutes on Blind Logic during my briefing as the incoming CINC in August." Once in Panama (on 29 September 1989), "the least of my problems at the time was Blind Logic....We put together the campaign for JUST CAUSE and probably did not spend enough time on the restoration."<sup>21</sup> Although Thurman recognized the lack of attention to restoration, it must be pointed out that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed planning to begin in February of 1988 for an operation in Panama. What then are some of the reasons for the problems that were experienced during the post-hostilities phase of JUST CAUSE?

One problem with Blind Logic arose from the use of the 361st Civil Affairs Brigade, a US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) CAPSTONE\*\* reserve unit. The 361st CA Brigade had developed expertise in Panama since 1983 and was the appropriate organization for final development of the plan. The 361st was relied on to develop the plan, however, the lack of a Presidential authorization for a Selected Reserve Call-Up resulted in a piecemeal effort by rotating unit personnel on 31 day active duty tours to support SOUTHCOM. The whole incident with the 361st demonstrated that the Active Army leadership did not have a full understanding of what was available under the authority, what the Reserves were capable of, and what they were not.<sup>22</sup>

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\* General Thurman was CINCSOUTHCOM, Blue Spoon was the plan for the combat phase, and Blind Logic was the plan for the restoration of Panama.

\*\* CAPSTONE is a program that aligns Active Component and Reserve Component units to meet the total Army's wartime requirements.

With proper focus on strategic level planning, and using the suggested phases, JUST CAUSE planning may have better identified resources and forces required to perform the necessary tasks. Although often times our planning becomes crisis action planning, it is always important to identify requirements and forces as early as possible. Reserve Component forces can provide significant expertise, but they require appropriate notice of activation because of their civilian employer commitments.

By using this model of planning, the planner can also recognize the need for interagency, NGO's and PVO's. The lack of interagency participation in the planning contributed to the post-hostilities problems of JUST CAUSE. It is inevitable that there will be a gradual transition from purely military activities during the hostilities and conflict termination phases to more interagency and NGO involvement as the desired end state is approached. How, where and when these agencies and organizations are allowed to perform their legitimate role will continue to be a problem because of security issues. Planning in isolation, however, whether by accident or design, will surely result in strategies, campaign, and operations plans that are much less than optimal.<sup>23</sup>

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY demonstrates the concept of strategic level phases. Moreover, it will provide insight to how one organization, USFORHAITI, planned the final phase of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

UPHOLD DEMOCRACY had distinct phases that coincided with those outlined. A conflict involving the legitimacy of the Haitian government developed in which the US determined its interests were best served by intervention. A pre-hostility phase occurred in which diplomatic efforts attempted to restore the legitimate government. When it became apparent that the objectives set forth for the pre-hostility phase were proving to be unsuccessful the hostilities phase

was planned. United Nations Security Council Resolution 940 provided the mandate to use the necessary means to remove the military leadership of Haiti, return the legitimately elected President and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment. Additional tasking was to facilitate free and fair legislative elections for determination of President Aristide's government.<sup>24</sup>

The hostilities phase was planned and executed by Joint Task Force (JTF) 180. However, because diplomatic efforts secured agreements to allow for President Aristide's return, a permissive entry was conducted to provide a secure and stable environment in Haiti.

Specific end states were determined for the phased operation. When the pre-hostility phase was unable to secure the return of President Aristide to power, the hostilities phase was executed. Then, as the environment was determined to be secure and stable JTF 180 was withdrawn and JTF 190, a regional Multi-National Force (MNF), was inserted to continue to provide for a secure and stable environment.<sup>25</sup> This was the end of the conflict termination phase and the beginning of the post-hostilities phase. It also demonstrates a transition from military combat forces to a lesser force whose goal would be to remove outside military forces and restore local government. JTF 190's mission was to continue the secure and stable environment and prepare for an end state in which the UN Mission in Haiti could provide for the security of Haiti.<sup>26</sup>

What is important about the final phases of UPHOLD DEMOCRACY is the method that USFORHAITI planned for the exit strategy\* and its' mission in Haiti. USFORHAITI was a brigade-level headquarters staff. As such it used a common tool to the Army, the "Mission Statement and Commander's Intent." By using this process it developed detailed planning,

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\* Exit strategy is a relatively new development involving the subject of war termination. Joint Pub 3-0 states, "the military instrument of power can give way to other instruments. It attempts to identify a limit to US military force involvement often measured by time. At some point, military forces will be largely in support of other US and international agency efforts." This does not alter the concept but reinforces it by acknowledging the transition from military forces to other US agencies and NGO's to provide conflict resolution and achievement of the end state.

including Courses of Action (COA) development to support its' objectives and the commander's intent. It also wargamed the COA's for selection of the optimal COA.<sup>27</sup> By doing so, it used a tool that it was experienced with and would optimize their planning. During the period USFORHAITI was in command the planners used the Commander's Estimate process to define how it would conclude its mission in Haiti. Each COA considered the major events that supported or would conflict with the attainment of its end state. Operational art could then be applied and branches developed.

Haiti continues to be plagued by extensive political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental problems. The United Nations does not have the resources to undertake the massive nation-building efforts this disaster-torn country requires.<sup>28</sup> Haiti is an example whereas the commander can achieve military objectives but conflict resolution is not achieved. This is largely because of our limited and value based strategic aims.

### **Clear Political Objectives**

War is an adjunct of politics and therefore within political objectives we find the guidance to the desired end state. However, as previously stated, the difficulty in defining the end state has significantly increased in the post-World War II era. The underpinnings to our political objectives have become more value-based as opposed to interest-based. Interest-based conflicts are disputes concerning territory, roles, economics, or similar issues amenable to negotiation, persuasion and coercion. Value-based conflicts, on the other hand, are inclined to be disputes over society or way of life, claims for equality of treatment, ideology or comparable struggles.<sup>29</sup> By their nature, value-based conflicts are more difficult to resolve and leave an avenue for a less than specific desired end state.

Additionally, our conflicts have become limited in nature. Limited engagements confront policy makers with the difficult task of setting “intermediate” political objectives, that is, objectives falling far short of pursuing the complete subordination of an adversary. These limitations on political ends are only accompanied by limitations on operational goals: policy makers cannot task their military forces with attaining “simple” and easily identifiable operational end-states, like totally destroying the adversary’s war waging capacity on the battlefield.<sup>30</sup>

There are several consequences to value-based, complex and intermediate political objectives. The most obvious is that the combatant commander’s task of defining a strategy that will match the national political objectives becomes extremely difficulty. Not only is it difficult to define an end state so that plans can be made to arrive at that state, planners must be prepared for change.

The planning method that we discussed in which a phased approach is adopted at the strategic level combined with operational art will assist the planner to better prepare for changes. Joint Publication 3-0 acknowledges that changes in phases at any level can represent a period of vulnerability for the force. At this point, missions and task organizations often change. The careful planning of branches and sequels can reduce the risk associated with the transition between phases.<sup>31</sup> This guidance is for campaign planning but if extended to the strategic phasing concept it has applicability. By recognizing each of the strategic phases, planning for each phase, realizing that there is risk during the transition from one phase to the other, and continually assessing whether the phases are in line with US National Security Strategy, the planner can develop branches. Although difficult to develop, branches are necessary to provide the commander flexibility by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan.<sup>32</sup>



Coalitions provide an added dimension to the determination of the desired end state. Because the United States will likely be a part of a coalition or a UN group, the various partners may have different perceptions of what the end state should look like, what means should be employed to reach it, and how much time and effort they are willing to expend to resolve the conflict.<sup>33</sup> This becomes all the more true when coalitions are attempting to define the end state in a limited, value-based conflict. More specifically, the task of defining the end state will become extremely difficult when the US, as part of a coalition, wishes to define the end state in reference to democratic values or human rights issues.

The nature of politics and the politician himself has significant impact on the achievement of the desired end state. Careful planning for a desired end state can be for naught if political rhetoric conflicts with stated objectives. It is imperative that policy makers understand the nature of the military, that it is a force that has been trained to engage and destroy an enemy. Politicians must be sensitive to clear and attainable objectives and not commit military force in support of unattainable objectives. The consequence of ill-advised political rhetoric or unattainable objectives is insufficient military force or the inability to reach strategic aims.

### **Desert Shield and Desert Storm**

As Iraq's military forces swallowed Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the reaction from the White House was stunned disbelief. This reaction rapidly gave way to anger when President George Bush declared, "This will not stand....This will not stand, this aggression against Kuwait."<sup>34</sup>

Viewed within the context of our phased approach, President Bush's statement signaled the transition of the US into the pre-hostility phase. Before this there had been a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait, primarily over economic interests. Because of US interests, the US would

become a party to the conflict with Kuwait. The same day of the Iraq invasion the UN Security Council called for Iraq's unconditional and immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. By mid-September, the objectives of the coalition had clearly been stated: the withdrawal of Iraq's forces from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwaiti sovereignty.<sup>35</sup>

Planning at US Central Command (CENTCOM) began immediately for the defense of Saudi Arabia and then for the eviction of Iraq's forces from Kuwait. By doing so would accomplish the first objective. However, as in JUST CAUSE the planning for the post-hostilities and conflict resolution phases, the phases that would accomplish the second objective, experienced problems. Two problems can be noted. The first is the lack of effective concurrent planning of phases *within CENTCOM*. The second is derived from the first problem, the lack of unity of effort.

The planning for the restoration of Kuwait was accomplished by three different agencies. The first and primary agency that began planning for the restoration of Kuwait was the Kuwait Task Force (KTF) formed under the direction of Colonel Randall Elliott.\* Shortly after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, it had become clear to Elliott that there was a high probability that the country would have to be liberated by force. If that came about it was equally clear that restoration of government and government services would be a major task and that planning for restoration should begin soon.<sup>36</sup> The KTF developed its plans in Washington, DC on an unclassified level so that interagency and the Kuwait Government in exile could mutually plan.

CENTCOM contingency plan 1002-90 contained a CA annex. This annex primarily focused on restoration of services with a *legitimate government* in place. As the crisis developed, the personnel from the Political-Military Division of the Policy, Plans, and Strategy

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\* Colonel Elliott, a US Army reservist was also a senior analyst in the Near East division of State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He was close friends with Ambassador designate to Kuwait, Ed Gnehm.

Directorate deployed to Saudi Arabia and an augmentation team from the 352d CA Command remained at MacDill to assist CENTCOM. Within CENTCOM the primary planning focused on combat plans.

ARCENT, who was designated the Executive Agent for CA by CENTCOM, found itself without a permanent CA staff. Therefore, an officer who had been formerly assigned to the Active Component 96th CA Battalion was sent from Fort Bragg. This officer restricted planning efforts to the 96th CA Battalion and excluded RC help until it was essential. Moreover, the 96th's assessment of the civil-military operations (CMO) never took the offensive option into account even though CENTCOM was including an offensive phase in its compartmented planning activities.<sup>37</sup>

The CMO plan that evolved as part of DESERT SHIELD and then DESERT STORM is too intricate to be dealt with here. However, there are two lessons to be learned. The first is that post-hostilities planning was conducted in isolation by three separate and distinct organizations and in the early stages was not under the direction of CINCCENTCOM. Therefore, unity of effort suffered. The second pertains to the timeliness of planning. The KTF recognized that planning for the restoration of Kuwait would be necessary in August. Nothing, however, happened to facilitate planning until the Emir of Kuwait sent President Bush a letter requesting planning assistance from DOD assets. The letter was received in October. After receipt it floundered within the bureaucracies of State and Defense for about six weeks until the KTF was finally activated as a planning cell for Kuwaiti restoration on December 1, 1990.<sup>38</sup> CMO and the post-hostilities phase were successful after DESERT STORM. However, there was duplication of effort and initially the planning was conducted without direction from the CINC.

The remaining issue within DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD is clear political objectives and will provide insight why we are still flying combat missions over northern and southern Iraq. The initial articulated objectives, backed by UN mandate, were interest based. They dealt with the removal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait that was forced into exile on August 2, 1990. What began almost immediately was a series of statements from the highest levels of the US government that indicated a different objective than the UN mandated objectives.

As early as August 6, 1990, *The Washington Post* reported that President Bush had ordered covert action to oust Saddam Hussein. On August 13, Reuters News Service indicated that Bush would be pleased if Saddam were overthrown. Moreover, the drumbeat continued well after the cease-fire with stories on March 16, April 8, April 29, and December 1 among many in a wide variety of media.<sup>39</sup> What this represents is a value-based objective that calls for the overthrow of a recognized government.

CENTCOM recognized the rhetoric but was apprehensive about what would transpire if Saddam was overthrown. CENTCOM therefore advised that the policy statement be changed to regional stability. However, CENTCOM failed to anticipate the consequences of the already political rhetoric and the effects on CMO the Shiite rebellion would have.<sup>40</sup>

Following the cease-fire the Shiites in southern Iraq revolted followed by the Kurds in northern Iraq. Saddam responded with armed aggression against both revolts. How much of the impetus to revolt came as a result of the American public diplomacy campaign almost certainly will never be satisfactorily determined. What is certain, however, is that the campaign clearly suggested to those already disposed to believe it that the United States Government would look with favor on any effort to overthrow Saddam Hussein.<sup>41</sup>

Therein lies why we are still flying combat missions over Iraq. Our objectives changed from clearly defined, limited, and interest based to broader, value based objectives. Although the rhetoric was ongoing throughout the pre-hostility, hostilities and conflict termination phase, the results of the shift to a different objective became apparent in the post-hostilities phase. The military accomplished its objectives superbly and successfully concluded the conflict termination phase with the leverage to support stated and mandated coalition strategic objectives. The coalition strategic objectives were accomplished, the US objectives were not. Provide Comfort and Southern Watch were promulgated as humanitarian relief efforts but could they not also be seen as efforts that continue to pursue the ultimate US goal?

### Conclusion

There are three recommendations that are valuable for the combatant commander and his staff. The first, is to know and *understand* the adversary's political, military, economic, and social structure. Moreover, apply this understanding when developing the theater strategy, as well as any operations that will occur within the theater. Use this understanding to prepare and plan for "undesirable" branches. Realize that the key to providing an enduring solution to the conflict is in the *adversary's background*.

The second is regarding planning. Commanders should develop their theater with a broad perspective. Use *strategic level phasing* as an approach to recognize and plan for conflict, pre-hostility, hostilities, conflict termination, post-hostilities and conflict resolution. *Concurrent planning* of the phases will allow for the efficient use of resources and forces, the application of operation art, planning for NGO's and PVO's, and will recognize the importance of interagency involvement.

The third recommendation regards political objectives. The commander must recognize the existence of *value-based desired end states*. By continually reconciling the theater strategy and operational plans with US National Security Strategy, the commander can plan branches to phases. Additionally, the commander must continually be aware of *political rhetoric* that may change the desired end state. The commander is particularly vulnerable to change during *transitions* between phases.

Lastly, the post-Cold War period has brought an era of limited, value-based objectives that will add to the fog and friction of war termination. For the foreseeable future, the commander will be tasked to plan for all phases of a conflict, from the beginning of the dispute to conflict resolution. Most certainly, the commander's job has become more difficult in the .....

#### **QUEST FOR THE DESIRED END STATE.**

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## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 579.
- <sup>2</sup> U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Operations: Publication 3-0, (Washington: 1995), III-23.
- <sup>3</sup> Lt Col Bob Leeker, Author of Paper, During Mission Flown in Support of Provide Comfort II.
- <sup>4</sup> Susan E. Strednansky, Balancing the Trinity: The Fine Art of Conflict Termination, (Maxwell AFB, ALA: U.S. Air University. School of Advanced Airpower Studies, 1996), 4.
- <sup>5</sup> Michael R. Rampy, "The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities," Military Review, October 1992, 43.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., 44.
- <sup>7</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, III-22.
- <sup>8</sup> Rampy, 44.
- <sup>9</sup> Strednansky, 4.
- <sup>10</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, III-2.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid., III-22.
- <sup>12</sup> A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, (The White House, February 1996), Preface. Emphasis added.
- <sup>13</sup> John T. Fishel, The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 4.
- <sup>14</sup> Richard H. Shultz Jr., In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause, (Maxwell AFB, ALA: Air University Press, 1993), 8.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., 28-29.
- <sup>16</sup> Strednansky, 13.
- <sup>17</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, III-18.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>19</sup> Bruce B. G. Clark, Conflict Termination: A Rational Model, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 4-6.
- <sup>20</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, III-18.
- <sup>21</sup> Richard H. Shultz Jr., In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause. (Maxwell AFB, ALA: Air University Press, 1993), 16.

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<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 68.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 66.

<sup>24</sup> Strednansky, 35.

<sup>25</sup> Kevin C. Benson and Christopher B. Thrash, "Declaring Victory: Planning Exit Strategies for Peace Operations." Parameters, Autumn 1996, 71.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>27</sup> Benson and Thrash, 72-77.

<sup>28</sup> Strednansky, 40.

<sup>29</sup> Rappy, 46.

<sup>30</sup> Ashley J. Tellis, "Terminating Intervention: Understanding Exit Strategy and U.S. Involvement in Intra-State Conflicts." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, April-June 1996, 121.

<sup>31</sup> Joint Publication 3-0, III-20.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Strednansky, 2.

<sup>34</sup> Fishel, John T. Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College. Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 12.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 13.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., 17.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., 19-20.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 14.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., 34.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 60.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 34.



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